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Artificial intelligence (AI), a branch of computer science based upon algorithms that can analyze data and 
make decisions autonomously, is becoming increasingly prevalent in the technology that powers modern 
society. Relatively little research has examined how humans modify their judgments in response to their 
interactions with AI. Our research explores how people respond to different types of risk management 
advice received from AI vs. a human expert in two contexts where AI is commonly deployed: medicine 
and finance. Through online studies with representative samples of Americans, we first find that 
participants generally prefer to receive medical and financial risk management advice from humans over 
AI. In two follow-up studies, we presented participants with a hypothetical medical or financial risk and 
asked them to make an initial decision—to address the risk immediately or to wait for more 
information—and to rate their confidence in this decision. Next, participants were informed that either a 
human expert or AI had analyzed their case and recommended either immediate risk management action 
or a wait-and-see approach. Participant then made a final decision using the same response scale as 
before. We compared participants’ initial and final decisions, examining the extent to which participants 
updated their decisions upon receiving their recommendation as a function of the recommendation itself 
and its source. We find that participants updated their decisions to a greater degree in response to 
recommendations from human experts as compared to AI, but the magnitude of this effect differed by 
context.  
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It was not long ago that artificial intelligence (AI) was largely confined to the realm of science fiction. 
Popular examples included the androids in the writing of Philip K. Dick; the defense computer, Skynet, 
which famously becomes “self-aware” in the Terminator films; and JARVIS (Just A Rather Very 
Intelligent System), Tony Stark’s AI-based personal assistant in the Marvel Cinematic Universe. Today, 
AI is not only a reality, it has become a pervasive force—albeit largely in the background—in our daily 
lives. Advancements in machine learning and AI have led to the development and deployment of devices 
and software that can offer advice to human decision-makers across a wide range of contexts ranging 
from the mundane (e.g., music recommendations) to the consequential (e.g., medical diagnoses and 
treatment plans).  
While specific definitions of AI can vary, AI is defined here as an advanced computer system that uses 
algorithms and statistical models to rapidly analyze large amounts of data in order to perform perceptual, 
cognitive, or conversational functions that are akin to speech or visual recognition, reasoning, and 
problem solving exhibited by humans (Longoni et al. 2019). We extend this definition of AI to include 
fully autonomous judgment and decision-making by a computer system; that is, the capability and 
freedom to make recommendations and choices without the need for regular human oversight.  
As AI becomes even more intelligent and autonomous, it is poised to be among the most transformative 
technologies in human history. For example, people around the world already rely on AI—whether they 
recognize it, or not—to make recommendations about travel, entertainment, and romantic partners. 
Beyond these relatively mundane applications, AI is expanding rapidly to other, more consequential 
contexts. For example, AI is already capable of performing diagnostic healthcare functions—at scale—
with a high level of accuracy (e.g., see Leachman and Merlino 2017) and at lower costs (e.g., see Esteva 
et al. 2017) when compared with humans working in a traditional healthcare setting. And, according to a 
2017 analysis by the consulting firm Accenture1, AI may save the healthcare sector $150 billion per year, 
as well as meet up to 20% of unmet healthcare demand in the U.S. alone, through increased technological 
efficiency.  
Beyond healthcare, AI is making significant inroads in the domain of FinTech (finance and technology). 
Here, AI is being deployed at scale to analyze the risk tolerance and financial objectives of consumers in 
order to help them make goal-based financial decisions – or, in many instances, to make these decisions 
on their behalf (Jung et al. 2018). To this end, nearly $1 trillion of investment capital is already being 
 
1 See Artificial Intelligence: Healthcare’s New Nervous System at https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/pdf-
49/accenture-health-artificial-intelligence.pdf 
 
managed by these so-called robo-advisors, or automated financial algorithms that allocate stocks within 
portfolios.  
Overall, the technical barriers to widespread implementation of AI continue to fall more rapidly than 
many would have believed possible less than a decade ago. But, research into the willingness of 
individuals to accept advice from AI2 has lagged behind technical developments in the field. Though not 
unexpected given the rapidity of AI deployment at scale, this gap could nevertheless have important 
implications for the development and rollout of AI technology. We make this claim because, regardless of 
technical achievements, adoption of AI will be delayed if individuals demonstrate an aversion to 
acceptance of algorithmic advice. There are countless examples of technologies—including 
nanotechnology (Siegrist et al. 2007), carbon capture and sequestration (L’Orange Seigo et al. 2014), and 
autonomous vehicles (Liu et al. 2019) among others—which have been developed to address health and 
environmental challenges, or to improve upon the societal status-quo, that have suffered from delayed or 
limited deployment because of elevated risk perceptions and a lack of public or consumer acceptance. In-
depth exploration of the topic of human-AI interaction is therefore critical if we are to continue to harness 
the potential benefits of this technology. 
Several past studies have examined the accuracy of algorithmic or actuarial decision-making, which 
describes the use of pre-set rules to analyze information and produce judgments. Generally speaking, this 
work has shown both that these types of algorithmic systems are more statistically accurate than 
individual “expert” judgments, and that experts tend to resist the use of such systems (Meehl 1954, 
Dawes et al. 1989). Possible sources of resistance to algorithmic decision-making include the 
misapplication of statistical probability to individual cases, and the cognitive availability bias of dramatic 
cases overshadowing less memorable but more likely outcomes (Dawes et al. 1989).  
There is also the challenge of feeling like one is making a decision on their own when relying on advice 
from an algorithm. This feeling of isolation manifests because the social context associated with seeking a 
diagnosis or recommendation from a human expert is not present when interacting with a machine. In a 
healthcare context, for example, Promberger and Baron (2006) observed a preference for human versus 
algorithmic medical advice and concluded that participants did so because it created a sense of 
collaboration and shared responsibility regarding a treatment decision and its outcome.  
 
2 Previous research has examined the willingness of individuals to accept advice from a non-human system versus a 
human source, but has used inconsistent terminology, labeling the non-human system either as an “algorithm” 
(Dietvorst et al. 2015, Logg et al. 2019) or “AI” (Longoni et al. 2019). We choose to label the non-human system as 
“AI” in our research because we believe such a label is usually how algorithmic systems are and will be presented to 
the general public.  
 
The rise to prominence of AI over the past five years has added to our understanding of algorithmic and 
actuarial decision-making with interesting and—at times—contradictory results. For example, Dietvorst 
et al. (2015) showed that participants appeared to demonstrate a resistance to algorithmic advice, even 
when human advice was demonstrably less accurate. Referring to this resistance as algorithm aversion, 
these results suggest that people appear to disproportionately ‘punish’ algorithms when they see such 
systems fail. That is, when observing both algorithmic and human-generated advice to be error-prone, and 
even in the knowledge that algorithmic advice is consistently less error-prone, participants lost confidence 
in AI systems more rapidly than they did in humans. 
In contrast, recent research by Logg et al. (2019) on what they termed algorithm appreciation suggests a 
preference for advice from AI when compared to the same advice from a human. In this study, 
participants were first asked to make a prediction (e.g., forecasting the popularity of a song on the 
Billboard Hot 100 chart or forecasting the probability of a business meeting a production target), and then 
provided them with advice from either AI or a human source; participants could then choose to update 
their predictions based on the advice they received. Adopting the Judge Advisor System (JAS) paradigm 
(Sniezek and Buckley 1995), the degree to which participants updated their predictions as a function of 
the advice received was measured by comparing the participants’ initial and final judgments. In contrast 
to prior work in AI, this study showed that participants were—on average—more receptive to advice from 
AI than they were to the same advice from a human across a variety of simple and relatively low-
consequence forecasting judgments. 
In today’s reality, however, AI is being deployed to offer advice or to make decisions across a wide range 
of more immediately consequential contexts. As we note above, AI is being deployed to provide 
diagnostic advice to human and algorithmic decision-makers in the fields of healthcare (Yu et al. 2018), 
finance (Aw et al. 2019), environmental conservation (Gonzalez et al. 2016), weather forecasting (Ji et al. 
2019), the day-to-day management of built infrastructure (Dounis 2010), and beyond. Thus, there is both 
an opportunity and a need to study the degree to which people will—or will not—use advice from AI to 
inform consequential judgments and decisions.  
With this opportunity and need as backdrop, the research reported unfolded across two related studies3 
and was designed to address three related objectives: 
First, in Study 1, we sought to examine to what extent people prefer to receive advice from AI vs. from a 
human expert in two consequential domains in which AI is commonly deployed: medicine and finance. 
 
3 Both studies were approved by the Health Sciences and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board (protocol 
number HUM00162568 at the University of Michigan. 
 
Based on the results of past literature pointing towards a generalized aversion to algorithmic advice, we 
hypothesized that people would generally prefer to receive advice from a human source relative to an 
algorithmic source.  
Second, in Study 2, we explored the degree to which people would update their judgments in the direction 
of advice offered by AI or a human expert in two hypothetical but realistic risk management scenarios 
concerning medical treatments and financial planning. We hypothesized once again that participants 
would display a preference for advice from human experts, and we explored the degree to which 
contextual differences impact this preference. 
Finally, the relationship between algorithm aversion (or appreciation) and a host of other variables (e.g., 
sociodemographic variables, value orientations, views about technology, etc.) has largely been 
unexplored. Thus, as part of Study 2, we conducted exploratory regression analyses to study the effect of 
these variables on the degree to which people were willing to update their judgments in the direction of 
advice offered by AI or a human expert.  
2. Study 1: Stated Preferences for Advice from AI 
2.1 Introduction 
As we note above, researchers have been divided regarding people’s willingness to accept advice from 
AI. Some studies (e.g., Longoni et al. 2019) have reported an aversion to accepting advice from AI out of 
concern that the algorithm will not take into account the unique characteristics or needs of the people 
seeking the advice. A substantial body of research in social psychology also points to the importance of 
self-uniqueness as a baseline condition of many individual judgments. For example, people routinely see 
themselves as unique in terms of their abilities, needs, values, and beliefs (Epstein 1990). In seeking and 
obtaining advice from a human expert, people are able to explain and contextualize their unique attributes 
in a way that is difficult to—at present—replicate with a computer. AI, on the other hand, is generally 
viewed by people as dehumanizing because computer systems, by the nature of their programming, are 
insensitive to this uniqueness and, as a result, aim for standardization at the expense of one’s individuality 
(Haslam 2006).   
Other research suggests that people may be averse to advice from AI because they are prone to quickly 
losing confidence in the technology after it has erred or given unhelpful advice. We know from research 
on risk perceptions that singular trust-destroying events loom larger in the mind than do an additive series 
of trust-building events (Slovic 1993). Recent research on AI suggests that this tendency to overreact to 
outcomes that may erode trust and confidence is even stronger when we consider the behavior of 
 
autonomous computer systems vs. the same behavior by human providers of advice (Dietvorst et al. 
2015).    
However, other studies (e.g., Logg et al. 2019) suggest that people are apt to more readily and frequently 
rely on advice from AI when making judgments. This may especially be the case in contexts that are 
algorithmically appropriate in that people already rely on AI for advice, or in cases where AI is already 
being used by large numbers of people. A decision-maker’s confidence in the advice received is also 
thought to matter. That is, in contexts where a decision-maker is not confident to proceed without external 
advice, they may be more willing to receive it from AI so long as the advice in question is of high quality.  
Given these conflicting findings, Study 1 was designed to explore a relatively straightforward question: 
when considering in consequential risk management contexts—namely healthcare and finance—do 
people prefer to receive advice from AI or a human expert? In addition, if advice from AI or a human 
expert was given, would they express willingness to follow it, and would they be confident in it?  
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Participants 
We recruited adults (over the age of 18) currently residing in the United States to participate in two 
variants of Study 1: a healthcare (Study 1A) and a finance (Study 1B) variant. Participants were recruited 
from online panels curated by Qualtrics® and were randomly drawn from a representative probability 
sample of active panel members. A power analysis conducted in G*Power (Faul et al. 2009) determined 
that, in order to obtain 80% power with the ability to detect a small effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.3) with our 
planned paired-samples t-tests, we needed to recruit 92 participants for both Studies 1A and 1B. We 
oversampled for both of Studies 1A and 1B because we anticipated that several participants would fail our 
data quality assurances.  
A total of 110 participants were recruited to participate in Study 1A and another 126 participants were 
recruited to participate in Study 1B. A total of 5 participants in Study 1A, and 21 participants in Study 
1B, were removed from the final samples because they failed an instructed-choice attention check. Of the 
105 participants that remained in Study 1A, 50.5% were female, the average age was 63.5 years (SD = 
15.4), and 55.2% of participants had an education level corresponding with a bachelor’s degree or higher. 
Of the 105 participants that remained in Study 1B, 48.6% were female, the average age was 50.6 years 





After providing their informed consent, participants in Study 1A and 1B (see the Supplemental Materials 
section for the complete instruments) were first asked to read a preamble describing AI, which informed 
them that AI was defined in the study as an advanced computer system that could quickly analyze large 
amounts of data and makes recommendations or decisions without human input or supervision. Next, 
participants were asked to assume that in the near future, they will be faced with an important decision 
that could have a significant impact on their personal health (Study 1A) or their financial health (Study 
1B). Participants in Study 1A and 1B were then asked to respond to the same five questions about 
receiving advice in their assigned context. 
The first question asked participants if they would prefer to receive recommendations from a human 
expert or AI in their assigned context; responses were collected on 7-point Likert scales where 1 = I 
strongly prefer a human expert and 7 = I strongly prefer AI (midpoint = I am indifferent).  
Question 2 asked participants about the degree to which they would follow a recommendation offered by 
a human expert, and Question 3 asked about the degree to which they would follow a recommendation 
offered by AI in their assigned context; responses to both questions were collected on 7-point Likert 
scales where 1 = Definitely not and 7 = Definitely yes (midpoint = maybe).  
Question 4 asked how confident participants would be in a recommendation offered by a human expert, 
and Question 5 asked how confident participants would be in a recommendation offered by AI; responses 
to these questions were also collected on 7-point Likert scales where 1 = Not at all confident and 7 = Very 
confident (midpoint = Somewhat confident).  
Before the close of the survey, participants reported their gender, age, education level, political ideology, 
and religiosity. Participants also answered the technological optimism and technological dependence 
subscales of the Technology Adoption Propensity Index (Ratchford and Barnhart 2012) and responded to 
the a series of questions aimed at ascertaining the degree to which they ascribe to egoistic, altruistic, and 
biospheric value orientations (de Groot and Steg 2007). Finally, participants were also asked to report the 
extent to which they agreed with the following two statements: “I generally trust medical professionals” 
and “I generally trust financial professionals.” Responses to these questions were collected using 7-point 
Likert scales from 1 = Strongly agree to 7 = Strongly disagree (midpoint = Neither agree nor disagree).  
2.2.3 Analysis  
We compared responses to the five questions asked in Study 1A and 1B using paired-samples t-tests (for 
within-study comparisons) and Welch two-sample t-tests (for across-study comparisons). 
 
2.3 Results and Discussion 
In both the healthcare and finance contexts, participants indicated a strong preference for advice from 
human experts over AI (Table 1). Though participants in the finance context appeared to be less firm in 
their preference for advice from a human expert (vs. participants in the healthcare condition), this 
difference was not significant at a Bonferroni corrected alpha of 0.01 (adjusted for the 5 across-study 
comparisons in Table 1).  
Within both the healthcare and finance contexts, participants reported being more likely to follow a 
recommendation from a human expert over a recommendation from AI, tHealthcare = 12.36, p < 0.001; tFinance 
= 7.96, p < 0.001. Across contexts, participants were more willing to follow a recommendation from a 
human expert for a healthcare decision than a financial decision, and equally likely to follow a 
recommendation from an AI in both contexts (Table 1). 
Within both the healthcare and finance contexts, participants reported being more confident in a 
recommendation from a human expert when compared with a recommendation from AI, tHealthcare = 12.01, 
p < 0.001; tFinance = 7.73, p < 0.001. Across contexts, participants were more willing to follow a 
recommendation from a human expert for a healthcare decision than a financial decision, and equally 
likely to follow a recommendation from an AI in both contexts (Table 1). 
Table 1. Summary data for Studies 1A and 1B. 
 Healthcare Finance   
 * SD * SD t p 
Q1. Preference (Human Expert vs. AI) 2.03 1.58 2.49 1.81 -1.99 0.048 
Q2. Likely to Follow – Human Expert 5.77 1.35 5.26 1.37 2.75 0.007 
Q3. Likely to Follow – AI 3.32 1.51 3.61 1.66 -1.31 0.19 
Q4. Confidence in Human Expert 5.66 1.25 5.18 1.24 2.77 0.006 
Q5. Confidence in AI 3.25 1.56 3.67 1.67 -1.88 0.062 
*Preferences were elicited on a 7-point Likert scale where 1 = a strong preference for a human expert and 7 
= a strong preference for AI. 
 
Tables S1 and S2 of the Supplemental Materials report exploratory linear regressions predicting the five 
dependent measures of Table 1 separately for the two contexts, as a function of demographic covariates. 
Across contexts, participants with greater trust in professionals report being more willing to follow and 
have confidence in a recommendation from a human expert; participants with greater technological 
optimism and egoism report being more likely to follow and have confidence in a recommendation from 
an AI. Detailed results are in the Supplemental Materials. 
x x 
 
These results are consistent with prior research (Meehl 1954, Dawes et al. 1989, Longoni et al. 2019) that 
points to algorithm aversion on the part of human decision-makers who may receive advice from a human 
expert or AI. Participants in both the healthcare and finance contexts indicated a strong preference for 
receiving recommendations from human experts over AI. Across contexts, however, the preference for a 
human expert appeared to be somewhat stronger in the healthcare context: participants reported being 
more likely to follow a recommendation from a human expert, and placing more confidence in a 
recommendation from a human expert, in the healthcare as compared to the finance context. 
A limitation of Study 1 is that it, like other studies, focuses on the question of decision-makers’ 
receptivity to getting advice from AI using a stated preference research approach. We know from several 
studies across different disciplines that attitudes and preferences expressed in the absence of the need to 
make a choice—i.e., revealed preference—are prone to potentially biased reporting by participants 
(Samuelson 1938, Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). Thus, Study 2 looked more deeply into the question of 
whether people would accept and follow advice from AI in the same two consequential risk management 
contexts: healthcare and finance.  
3. Study 2: Revealed Preferences for Advice from AI 
3.1 Introduction 
In addition to the challenges posed by stated preference studies, prior research on algorithm aversion has 
focused largely on one’s willingness to accept and follow advice from AI in rather inconsequential (e.g., 
forecasting the popularity of a song) or contextually distal (e.g., forecasting political events) situations. 
We, therefore, questioned whether the observed discrepancies regarding algorithm aversion and algorithm 
appreciation may be caused by the fact that, in many instances, people are not being asked about their 
willingness to accept advice from AI in situations that are likely to be both personally consequential and 
algorithmically appropriate (meaning that AI as a source of advice is already being deployed for these 
contexts in the real-world and at scale).  
Thus, Study 2 was designed to place participants in either a healthcare or finance context in which they 
would receive advice from either an established human expert or AI. We hypothesized that participants 
would, as in Study 1, exhibit strong algorithm aversion. However, we also expected that in the more 
temporally distal, and existentially less threatening finance context, people would exhibit lower levels of 




We recruited adults (over the age of 18) currently residing in the United States to participate in one of two 
experiment, examining decision-making in either a healthcare or a finance context. A power analysis 
conducted in G*Power indicated that in order to have 80% power to detect a small effect size of f = 0.15, 
for a planned 4-group, one-way ANOVA, we would need to recruit 492 participants per context. 
Anticipating that some participants would fail data quality assurance measures, we aimed to recruit 500 
participants for each context. Participants were recruited from online panels curated by Qualtrics® and 
were randomly drawn from a representative probability sample of active panel members. Anticipating that 
some participants would fail our data quality assurances, we oversampled for each context, ultimately 
recruiting 600 participants for the healthcare context and 574 participants for the finance context. Eighty-
three participants from the healthcare context and 64 participants from the finance context were excluded 
due to failing an instructed-choice attention check. Of the final sample of 517 participants in the 
healthcare context, 56.7% were female, the average age was 51.9 years (SD = 17.1) and 49.9% of 
participants had a bachelor’s degree or higher level of education. Of the final sample of 508 participants 
in the finance context, 47.8% were female, the average age was 50.2 years (SD = 16.5) and 50.4% of 
participants had a bachelor’s degree or higher level of education. One-way ANOVAs, treating each of the 
four conditions separately, revealed no significant differences in gender, age, and education across 
conditions (healthcare survey: all p’s > 0.15; finance survey: all p’s > 0.12). 
3.2.2 Design 
Within each of the two contexts, participants were randomly assigned to condition using a 2 
(recommendation source: human expert vs. AI) by 2 (recommendation: immediate action vs. delayed 
action) between-subjects design.  
After providing informed consent, all participants read the same preamble, informing them that they 
would be receiving a recommendation from either a human expert or AI, and defining AI as in Study 1. 
Then, participants were asked to imagine themselves in a risky and uncertain situation: 
In the healthcare context, participants were told to imagine that they were diagnosed with a cancerous 
tumor that could metastasize and be fatal, or remain static and benign. The probability of metastasis was 
presented as uncertain. Participants were next informed that they could either decide—on their own—to 
have immediate surgery (accompanied by the risk of post-operative infection) or wait-and-see for one 
year (accompanied by the risk of cancer metastasis in the interim). See the Supplemental Materials 
section for the complete scenario. 
In the finance context, participants were told to imagine that they owned a portfolio of investments 
dominated by companies that produce oil and gas, and were informed of the possibility that companies 
 
that produce energy from renewables may soon outperform them. The timing of this inflection point in 
the market was presented as uncertain. Participants were next informed that they could either decide—on 
their own—to immediately rebalance their portfolios in the direction of companies that produce energy 
from renewables (accompanied by the risk of losing money of oil and gas companies continue to perform 
well) or wait-and-see for one year (accompanied by the risk of losing money if renewables companies 
surge in their profitability). See the Supplemental Materials section for the complete scenario. 
In both contexts, participants were next asked to make an initial binary judgment—to take immediate 
action or to wait-and-see—and then rate their confidence in this judgment on a sliding scale from 50% 
(just guessing) to 100% (completely certain). 
After making this initial judgment, participants in both contexts were randomly assigned to one of four 
treatments:  
In the healthcare context, participants were informed that either their human physician or a medical AI 
(working without direct human supervision) had reviewed their case and recommended either immediate 
action or a wait-and-see approach for one year.  
In the finance context, participants were informed that either their human financial advisor or a financial 
AI (working without direct human supervision) had reviewed their portfolio and recommended immediate 
action or a wait-and-see approach for one year.  
Participants were then asked to make a final binary judgment—to take immediate action or to wait-and-
see—and then rate their confidence in this decision on a sliding scale from 50% (just guessing) to 100% 
(completely certain). 
After this final judgment was made, we asked participants to answer the same demographic and 
attitudinal questions posed at the end of Study 1.  
3.2.3 Analysis 
In order to analyze the judgments of participants as a function of the kind of advice they received, we 
constructed an dependent (updating) variable, U, which was the extent to which participants updated their 
initial judgments in the direction of the recommendation they received, based on prior research (Logg et 
al. 2019). To do so, we converted initial and final judgments (to delay or take immediate action) and their 
accompanying confidence rating into a 0 to 100 scale. Here, 0 represented complete confidence in the 
decision to delay action and 100 represented complete confidence in the decision to take immediate 
action; 50 represented all of the “just guessing” responses regardless of whether a participant chose to 
take immediate action, or to delay action.  
 
Next, we treated the advice received from the human expert or AI as certain, corresponding to a scale 
rating of either 0 (complete confidence in the recommendation to delay action) or 100 (complete 
confidence in the recommendation to take immediate action). We then calculated the updating variable 
for each participant as follows: 
𝑈 =
Recommendation − Final Judgment 
Recommendaton − Initial Judgment
 
For example, assume a participant initially selected immediate action in the healthcare condition but 
indicated 50% confidence in this judgment. Then, after receiving a recommendation from AI to take 
immediate action the participant once again selected immediate action but now with 75% confidence in 
this judgment. Thus, U for this participant in their assigned combination of condition and treatment was: 
𝑈 =
100 − 75 
100 − 50
= 0.5 
This value of U = 0.5 was interpreted as the participant updating their judgment by 50% in the direction of 
the recommendation given.  
Our study design (and the calculation of our dependent measure, U ) also gave participants the option to 
update in the opposite direction of the advice. For example, a participant who decided to take immediate 
action with 75% confidence, was then provided with a recommendation to take immediate action, and 
then decided to wait-and-see with 75% confidence, would be updating in the opposite direction of the 
advice. Updating in the opposite direction of the advice corresponds with a negative value for U. In prior 
research (Logg et al. 2019), these negative values have been Winsorized and converted to a value of U = 
0. We adopted the same approach in this study.  
Updating in the opposite direction of the advice may occur due to participant inattention, difficulty 
recalling initial responses, an aversion to the advice, or a rethinking of one’s initial stance. Initial analyses 
of our data revealed that 22% of participants (n = 114) in the healthcare context and 20% of participants 
(n = 100) in the finance context updated in the opposite direction of the advice. If these responses 
stemmed from aversion to the advice or rethinking of initial responses, then Winsorizing these responses 
by setting them equal to 0 would treat such responses as having placed no weight whatsoever on the 
advice. On the other hand, if such responses stemmed from inattentive participants, then excluding these 
inattentive responses would be appropriate as they provide no informational value about updating from 
advice. Since we could not tell the difference between those two explanations based on the data we 
collected, we report the results with Winsorized data below. However, we report the results excluding 
 
responses with a negative updating variable, U, in the Supplemental Materials section.  We discuss the 
differences between these data sets in the Supplemental Materials. 
Additionally, in the healthcare context, 41 participants received a recommendation that was equivalent to 
their initial judgment, and were thus excluded from the data because of our inability to examine updating 
in response to the advice. Likewise, in the finance, 19 participants received a recommendation that was 
equivalent to their initial judgment; these participants were also excluded from our analysis. 
We used a two-way ANOVA to examine the extent to which participants updated in the direction of the 
recommendation received as a function of the type of recommendation (delayed or immediate action), its 
source (human expert or AI), and their interaction. We also conducted exploratory linear regression to 
predict updating as a function of recommendation, source of recommendation, and the covariates and 
demographics. 
3.3 Results and Discussion 
In the healthcare context, a two-way ANOVA showed a significant main effect of recommendation 
source, such that individuals updated their judgments in the direction of a recommendation to a greater 
degree when it came from a human expert vs. AI (F(1,472) = 80.51, p < .001, η2 = 0.15). We observed no 
significant main effect of recommendation (e.g. to delay action or to take immediate action) (F(1,472) = 
0.82, p > 0.05, η2 = 0.001), and no interaction between the recommendation and its source (F(1,472) = 0.11, 
p > 0.05, η2 = 0.000); see Table 2.  
Table 2. Updating by condition. 
  Healthcare Finance   
Source Recommendation n  SD n  SD t p 
Human Expert Immediate Action 108 0.45 0.36 128 0.29 0.31 3.87 <0.001 
Human Expert Delayed Action 126 0.44 0.35 123 0.28 0.31 3.75 <0.001 
AI Immediate Action 107 0.20 0.30 123 0.17 0.26 0.91 0.37 
AI Delayed Action 135 0.17 0.27 117 0.23 0.29 -1.64 0.10 
 
In the finance context, we also found a significant main effect of recommendation source, such that 
individuals updated their judgments in the direction of a recommendation to a greater degree when it 
came from a human expert vs. AI (F(1,487) = 10.7, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.02). Once again, we observed no 
significant main effect of recommendation (F(1,487) = 0.9, p > 0.05, η2 = 0.002), and no interaction between 
the recommendation and its source (F(1,487) = 1.3, p > 0.05, η2 = 0.001); see Table 2.  
Participants updated their initial judgment to a greater degree when receiving a recommendation from a 
human expert in the healthcare context than they did in the finance context; we observed this pattern for  
x x 
 
both recommendations (immediate action or wait-and-see; Table 2). These differences were significant at 
a Bonferroni-corrected alpha of 0.0125. In contrast, participants updated their initial judgment to the same 
degree when receiving a recommendation from AI in both the healthcare and finance contexts (Table 2). 
We conducted exploratory linear regressions predicting updating as a function of condition and 
covariates. Table 3 shows that, in the healthcare context, more religious participants and those with 
greater technological dependence updated less in response to the advice; those with greater trust in 
medical professionals and greater biospherism updated more. In the finance context, participants with 
greater technological optimism and those with greater trust in financial professionals updated more in 
response to the advice. 
Table 3. Updating from the recommendation as a function of condition and covariates. 
 Healthcare Finance 
 β 95% CI η2 β 95% CI η2 
Source (binary; 1 = AI) -0.285*** -0.36, -0.21 0.17 -0.04 -0.11, 0.034 0.02 
Recommendation (binary; 1 = 
immediate action) 
0.02 -0.059, 0.099 0.00 0.017 -0.055, 0.089 0.00 
Source 𝗑 Recommendation 0.022 -0.09, 0.13 0.00 -0.073 -0.17, 0.03 0.00 
Male 0.045 -0.014, 0.1 0.00 -0.033 -0.086, 0.02 0.00 
Age -0.0003 -0.002, 0.002 0.00 0.0001 -0.0017, 0.0019 0.00 
Education -0.019 -0.039, 0.0012 0.01 0.012 -0.007, 0.03 0.00 
Political Liberalism -0.012 -0.027, 0.0024 0.01 -0.01 -0.023, 0.003 0.01 
Religiosity -0.016* -0.031, -0.002 0.01 -0.012 -0.025, 0.0015 0.02 
Technological Optimism 0.026 -0.003, 0.057 0.01 0.038** 0.013, 0.064 0.00 
Technological Dependence -0.021* -0.042, -
0.0001 
0.01 -0.005 -0.025, 0.015 0.02 
Trust in Human Experts 0.060*** 0.035, 0.085 0.05 0.028** 0.0087, 0.047 0.00 
Egoism 0.001 -0.018, 0.021 0.00 -0.005 -0.023, 0.014 0.00 
Biospherism 0.026* 0.001, 0.051 0.01 0.002 -0.023, 0.028 0.00 
Altruism -0.006 -0.036, 0.024 0.00 0.012 -0.017, 0.041 0.00 
Constant 0.183 -0.062, 0.43  -0.049 -0.28, 0.19  
n 476 491 
R2 0.238 0.086 
Adjusted R2 0.215 0.059 
Residual Standard Error 0.305 0.286 
F 10.306*** (df= 14, 461) 3.213*** (df = 14, 476) 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
 
4. General Discussion 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is being used today to provide advice to decision-makers across a wide variety 
of contexts, but relatively little research has examined uptake of advice proffered by AI. What research 
has been conducted has found conflicting evidence as to whether humans prefer advice from human 
experts or AI (Dietvorst et al. 2015, Logg et al. 2019, Longoni et al. 2019). We investigated preferences 
for advice from human experts and AI in two contexts in which AI has been commonly and 
consequentially deployed: healthcare and finance. In Study 1, we found that participants generally 
preferred advice from a human expert as compared to AI in both contexts, and indicated a greater 
 
willingness to follow and have confidence in advice from a human expert. However, participants more 
strongly preferred advice from a human expert in the healthcare context as compared to the finance 
context; there were no differences across context with respect to preferences for advice from AI.  
In Study 2, we presented participants with a hypothetical medical or financial decision and examined the 
degree to which they updated their initial judgments after receiving advice from a human expert or an AI. 
In both scenarios, participants updated their judgments further in the direction of advice received when it 
came from a human expert as compared to an AI, regardless of the nature of advice (i.e., to take 
immediate action or to wait). Participants updated more in response to the human expert in the healthcare 
scenario as compared to the finance scenario; participants updated similarly in response to the AI in both 
scenarios. Across both studies, we find A) an overall preference for advice from human experts as 
compared to AI, B) a stronger preference for human experts in a healthcare vs a financial context, and C) 
similar evaluations of AI advice in a healthcare and financial context.  
Overall, our findings reflect a preference for advice from human experts as compared to AI, with 
differences in advice-taking across healthcare and finance contexts. At first glance, our results are more 
consistent with previous findings of algorithm aversion (Dietvorst et al. 2015, Dietvorst et al. 2016, 
Longoni et al. 2019) than algorithm appreciation (Logg et al. 2019). However, these previous studies 
differed from our study, and each other, in several important ways that complicate our conclusions.  
Previous findings of algorithm aversion (Dietvorst et al. 2015, Dietvorst et al. 2016) have typically asked 
participants to choose between their own judgments and those of an algorithm; in contrast, studies 
showing algorithm appreciation typically examine the weight placed on advice from either a human 
(another participant) or an AI advisor (Logg et al. 2019). Indeed, this latter study showed that algorithm 
appreciation decreases when choosing between the estimates of an AI and one’s own estimates, as 
compared to when choosing between the estimates of an AI and another participant’s estimates. We 
examined the weight placed on advice from either humans or AI, but unlike in Logg et al. (2019), the 
human advice in our study came from human experts rather than other participants.  
Another important difference between our work and previous work is that tasks used in these previous 
studies—estimating a person’s weight from a photograph, the popularity of a song, the attractiveness of a 
person from a written description, the success of an MBA applicant, the test scores of a student, the 
ranking of US states by number of departing airline passengers (Dietvorst et al. 2015, Dietvorst et al. 
2016, Logg et al. 2019)—are about outcomes external to one’s own, while our studies asked participants 
to consider hypothetical scenarios involving oneself. Our study is most similar to research by Longoni et 
al. (2019), who compared receptivity to human vs automated healthcare providers in the medical domain 
 
by asking participants to consider hypothetical scenarios involving their own personal health, and who 
found a preference for human healthcare providers over automated providers. Our findings in the 
healthcare domain reflect those of Longoni et al. (2019), while our comparisons across the healthcare and 
finance domains suggest potentially important differences in preferences for algorithms vs. human experts 
across domains.  
Longoni et al. (2019) suggest that a preference for human-generated advice in a medical context may 
stem from “uniqueness neglect”, or the perceived inability of AI to properly account for the unique 
characteristics of individuals. This concept harkens back to the “broken leg” hypothesis (Meehl 1954), 
which points out that people may resist algorithmic decision-making because they believe that the 
algorithm may be unable to account for relevant features that lie outside of the decision-making domain. 
For example, an algorithm that predicts whether or not the individual will go to the cinema on a Friday 
night, based on past behavior of the individual, may have difficulty accounting for a sudden leg injury, 
whereas such a factor would be patently obvious to a human judge. Longoni et al. (2019), find that 
participants who perceive their case to be more unique are more likely to resist AI-generated medical 
advice, and finds that resistance is lower when the AI-generated medical advice is described as 
personalized, or is given as a supplement to a human doctor’s advice.  
In Study 2, we observed similar levels of updating from AI-generated advice across the healthcare and 
finance domains, which could suggest similar importance of “uniqueness neglect” across these domains 
as a driver of algorithm aversion. An individual’s financial portfolios and goals might be perceived as 
unique in the same way that one’s health status is. In contrast, we observe greater updating from human-
generated advice in the healthcare versus the financial scenario. These differences may stem from 
differential amounts of trust in human doctors as opposed to financial providers; indeed, we find 
participants report significantly greater levels of trust in medical professionals than financial professionals 
(  = 5.40 vs.  = 4.42, t = 11.6, p < 0.001).  
Taken together, these results suggest that future work on algorithm aversion or appreciation should take 
into account not only the factors influencing trust in or aversion to algorithms, but also the factors 
influencing the extent to which human expertise is trusted in the task domain, which may differ by 
domain. Algorithms may be more likely to be seen as viable alternatives to human judgment in domains 
where human judgment is less trusted or in which the conditions for human expertise are less likely to be 
met (Kahneman and Klein 2009).  
Likewise, future experimental research may also present respondents with information that contextualizes 
AI programming. Algorithms require initial input and programming from humans; information about AI 
x x 
 
that makes clear to users who was behind its creation (e.g., programming input from people with domain-
specific expertise—i.e., medical or financial experts in the case of our research—who also understand the 
user’s personal objectives) may counteract the apparent skepticism of AI that we observed in our study. 
Similarly, future work should further explore how willingness to trust AI in risk management decisions is 
related to other dimensions of (un)trustworthiness such as concerns about racial bias (e.g., Caliskan et al. 
2017, Gianfrancesco et al. 2018). 
Our findings are subject to several limitations. As mentioned, we observed a stronger preference for 
human experts in the healthcare context compared to the finance context, suggesting that preferences for 
advice from human experts vs. AI may be context-dependent. Future work should test the generalizability 
of these findings to additional contexts in which AI is deployed. In addition, we examined preferences 
and decision-making in hypothetical scenarios that may lack key context present in real-world decision-
making involving AI advice. Future work should continue to examine acceptance of AI advice in real-
world decision-making, and should expand to examine not only individual decision-makers but also 
policymakers and business leaders whose decisions impact many. 
AI can perform tasks that are typically thought of as being within the exclusive domain of human 
experts—such as medical diagnoses and treatment recommendations, and personal financial planning—
with high accuracy and low costs (e.g., see Leachman and Merlino 2017), potentially leading to 
substantial gains in welfare. As AI continues to shape everyday life and decision-making, however, our 
research suggests it may have significant barriers to overcome before its advice is seen as a trustworthy as 
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Study 2: Supplementary Methods and Results: 
Twenty-two percent of participants (N = 114) in the healthcare context and 20% of participants (N = 100) 
in the financial context) updated in the opposite direction of the advice. In the main text, we report the 
results with Winsorized data; here, we report the results excluding responses with negative updating 
values. 
In the healthcare context, omitting rather than Winsorizing data corresponding to updating in the opposite 
direction of the advice left us with 402 participants. Of these participants, 44.8% were male, mean age 
was 51.9 (SD = 17.2), and 50% had a Bachelor’s degree or higher. 
In the finance context, omitting rather than Winsorizing data corresponding to updating in the opposite 
direction of the advice left us with 402 participants. Of these participants, 50.4% were male, mean age 
was 51.2 (SD = 16.1), and 52.3% had a Bachelor’s degree or higher. 
In the healthcare context, we found that individuals update more when they receive advice from a human 
source relative to AI (F(1,398) = 62.9, p < .001). We also found that individuals update more when they 
receive advice to take immediate action relative to advice to delay action (F(1,398) = 4.2, p = 0.04). We 
did not find a significant interaction between the advice and the source of advice (F(1,398) = 0.8, p = 
0.36). 
In the financial context, we also found that individuals update more when they receive advice from a 
human source relative to AI (F(1,405) = 5.8, p = 0.02). We did not find a significant difference in 
updating to take immediate action versus delaying action (F(1,405) = 0.15, p = 0.7), and we also did not 
find a significant interaction between the advice and the source of advice (F(1,405) = 0.2, p = 0.66). 
  
 





















Advice from an 
AI 
Male -0.009 -0.284 0.024 0.013 -0.023 
Age -0.005 0.035*** 0.002 0.018* 0.0004 
Education -0.03 0.006 0.05 0.078 0.067 
Political Liberalism -0.068 -0.036 -0.031 0.015 0.009 
Religiosity -0.174* -0.012 -0.131 0.023 -0.1 
Technological Optimism 0.340* 0.087 0.319* -0.036 0.307 
Technological Dependence 0.111 -0.09 0.06 -0.1 0.117 
Trust in Health Professionals -0.216 0.149 -0.097 0.325** -0.063 
Egoism 0.125 0.102 0.19 0.032 0.227* 
Biospherism 0.269 -0.004 0.091 -0.165 0.13 
Altruism -0.282 0.178 -0.032 0.232 -0.129 
Constant 2.413 1.742 1.491 2.15 0.963 
N 105 105 105 105 105 
R2 0.209 0.255 0.14 0.266 0.157 
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.167 0.038 0.179 0.057 
Residual Standard Error 1.49 1.229 1.48 1.137 1.51 
F(11, 93) 2.235* 2.889** 1.376 3.063** 1.575 
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
  
 





















Advice from an 
AI 
Male 0.455 -0.069 0.266 -0.135 0.264 
Age -0.022 0.009 -0.017 -0.008 -0.011 
Education -0.189 0.063 0.026 0.045 0.042 
Political Liberalism 0.019 -0.08 -0.044 -0.056 -0.095 
Religiosity -0.093 -0.029 0.009 0.143* 0.045 
Technological Optimism 0.234 -0.154 0.415* -0.12 0.506** 
Technological Dependence -0.053 -0.021 -0.07 0.009 0.024 
Trust in Financial 
Professionals 
0.014 0.463*** -0.085 0.326** -0.102 
Egoism 0.260* 0.058 0.235* 0.063 0.223 
Biospherism 0.224 0.101 0.1 -0.114 0.24 
Altruism -0.276 0.163 -0.018 0.301* -0.084 
Constant 2.99 2.102 1.692 2.861** 0.35 
N 105 105 105 105 105 
R2 0.27 0.258 0.251 0.294 0.322 
Adjusted R2 0.184 0.17 0.162 0.211 0.242 
Residual Standard Error 1.634 1.244 1.515 1.1 1.457 
F(11, 93) 3.134** 2.939** 2.827** 3.525*** 4.014*** 
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
 
